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Ashamed to be selﬁsh
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We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems,
which are sets of payoff allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An
example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dicta-
tor game. The choice of an allocation from the set is observed by the recipient,
whereas the choice of the set itself is not. Behaving selﬁshly under observation,
in the sense of not choosing the normatively best allocation, inﬂicts shame on the
DM. We derive a representation that identiﬁes the DM’s private ranking of alloca-
tions, her subjective norm, and her shame. The normatively best allocation can
befurthercharacterizedastheNashsolutionofabargaininggameinducedbythe
second-stage choice problem.
Keywords. Shame, selﬁshness, subjective norm, dictator game, Nash bargaining
solution.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The notion of other-regarding preferences has attracted the attention of economists in
different contexts. The relevance of this motive to decision making is intuitive and has
been studied extensively. For example, in a classic dictator game, where one person gets
to anonymously divide, say, $10between herself and another person, people tend not to
take the whole amount for themselves, but to give a sum between $0 and $5 to the other
player (for a review, see Camerer 2003). They act as if they are trading off a concern
for fairness or for the other person’s incremental wealth with a concern for their own.
Thus, preferences for fairness as well as altruistic preferences have been considered (for
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example, Fehr and Schimdt 1999, Andreoni and Miller 2002,a n dCharnes and Rabin
2002).
Recent experiments, however, have challenged this interpretation. For example,
Dana et al. (2006) study a variant of the same dictator game, where the dictator is given
the option to exit the game before the recipient learns it is being played. In case she
opts out, she is given a prespeciﬁed amount of money and the recipient gets nothing.
About one-third of the participants choose to leave the game when offered $9 for them-
selves and $0 for the recipient. Write this allocation as ($9 $0). Such behavior contra-
dicts purely altruistic concern regarding the recipient’s payoff, because then the alloca-
tion ($9 $1) should be strictly preferred. It also contradicts purely selﬁsh preferences, as
then ($10 $0) would be preferred to ($9 $0). Instead, people seem to suffer from behav-
ing selﬁshly in a choice situation where they could behave pro-socially. Therefore, they
try to avoid getting into such a situation, if they can. Two examples of real-life scenarios
are crossing the road to avoid meeting a beggar and donating to charity over the phone,
but wishing not to have been home when the call came.
Wecontendthataperson’sbehaviormaydependonwhetheritisobservedbysome-
one who is directly affected by it. In this case, we say that the choice is observed. Other-
wise, we say that the decision maker chooses in private. We identify shame as the moral
cost an individual experiences if instead of choosing an alternative that she perceives to
be in accordance with a social norm (which might include, but is not limited to, consid-
erationsoffairnessandaltruism),sheisobservedchoosinganalternativethatfavorsher
own material payoffs.1 We refer to the criterion that determines whether an alternative
causes shame when it is not chosen as the individual’s (subjective) norm.
The signiﬁcance of the effect of observability on behavior is supported by additional
evidence. In a follow-up to the experiment cited above, Dana et al. report that only 1
out of 24 potential dictators exits the game, if he is assured that the recipient remains
ignorant about the way his payoffs are determined. Similarly, Pillutla and Murnighan
(1995) ﬁnd evidence that even if their identity is not revealed to the recipient, people’s
giving behavior depends on the information given to the recipient regarding the source
of the payoffs. In experiments related to our leading example, Lazear et al. (2006)a sw e l l
as Broberg et al. (2007) predict and ﬁnd that the most generous dictators are keenest to
avoid an environment where they could share with an observing recipient. Broberg et
al. further elicit the price subjects are willing to pay to exit the dictator game: they ﬁnd
that the mean exit reservation price equals 82% of the dictator game endowment.
1Our notion of shame is closely related to that of embarrassment and guilt. We use the word shame to
highlight that the emotional cost experienced by the decision maker (DM) is caused by her own actions.
In particular, it is not triggered by others’ actions, which place the DM in a socially awkward situation,
as is the case with embarrassment. One way to distinguish between shame and guilt is to view guilt as
involving regret, even in private, while, according to Buss (1980), “shame is essentially public; if no one else
knows,thereisnobasisforshame.[...]Thus,shamedoesnotleadtoself-controlinprivate.”Thepublic–
private distinction between guilt and shame is also suggested by Gehm and Scherer (1988). We adopt the
interpretation that even observation of a selﬁsh behavior without identiﬁcation of its purveyor can cause
shame. It is worth noting that in the psychological literature, one can ﬁnd other criteria for the distinction
between guilt and shame. For example, Lewis (1971) suggests that shame focuses on self (what we are)
whereas guilt focuses on behavior (what we do). A comprehensive discussion of guilt and shame can be
found in Tangney and Dearing (2002).Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Ashamed to be selﬁsh 101
To understand the notion of shame and its interaction with selﬁsh preferences, we
need to identify the effects of these two motives. A simple and tractable tool for analysis
is a utility function that is additively separable in the moral cost (shame) and the private
value of allocations, and that speciﬁes the properties of the shame component. We jus-
tifyusingthisconvenientformbyderivingitfromplausibleassumptionsonpreferences.
To this end, we consider games like that conceived by Dana et al. as a two-stage choice
problem. In the ﬁrst stage, the decision maker (DM) chooses a menu—a set of payoff
allocations between herself and the anonymous recipient. This choice is not observed
by the recipient. In the second stage, the DM chooses an alternative from the menu.
This choice is observed, in the sense that the recipient is aware of the menu available to
the DM.2 3 The DM has preferences over sets of alternatives (menus). Shame impacts
preferences through its anticipated effect on second-stage choices, where the presence
of a normatively better option reduces the attractiveness of an allocation. Our represen-
tation results demonstrate how the DM’s norm and her choice behavior interact. On the
one hand, properties of the norm impact choice; on the other hand, the norm can be
elicited from the DM’s choice behavior.
1.2 Illustration of results
Denote a typical menu by A ={ a b    }={ (a1 a2) (b1 b2)    },w h e r et h eﬁ r s ta n d
second components of each alternative are, respectively, the private payoff for the
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where u and ϕ are increasing in all arguments. The function u is a utility function over
allocations and the function ϕ represents the DM’s norm. The function g is interpreted
as the shame from choosing a in face of the alternative that maximizes the DM’s norm.
It is decreasing in its ﬁrst argument, increasing in its second argument, and satisﬁes
g(z z)= 0, that is, there is no shame if a normatively best alternative is chosen.
This representation captures the tension between the DM’s impulse to choose the
allocation she prefers in private and her desire to minimize shame. The value of a menu
is the sum of two distinct components. The ﬁrst component, u(a), gives the value of the
2The key distinction between the two stages is not the passage of physical time, but that the recipient
observes the choice set that is available in stage two and not the set of menus that are available in stage
one. This is in contrast to most other models of choice over menus, where subjective uncertainty might
resolve or temptation may kick in over time.
3If the exit option is chosen in the aforementioned experiment by Dana et al., the recipient is unaware
that there is a dictator who can chose another allocation. In their experiment, the recipient is further un-
aware that another person is involved at all. It would be interesting to see whether informing the recipient
that two people participate in the experiment and that the other person receives $9 would change the ex-
perimental ﬁndings.102 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
degenerate menu {a}. A degenerate menu leaves the DM with no choice to be made un-
der observation. We contend that there is no room for shame in this situation; the DM’s
ranking over degenerate menus can be thought of as her private ranking of allocations.
The second component is shame. It represents the cost the DM incurs when selecting
a in the face of one of the normatively best available alternatives, b∗ ∈ argmaxb∈Aϕ(b).
Although the private ranking over allocations might incorporate other-regarding prefer-
ences (such as altruism), we assume the DM to be more selﬁsh in private: among nor-
matively equally good alternatives, she prefers the one that gives her the highest private
payoff.
According to our interpretation of shame, we can relate choice to a second, induced
binary relation,  n, which captures the DM’s subjective norm. The relation  n is as-
sumed to satisfy the following three properties: ranking,w h i c hs a y st h a t n is weak
order; the Pareto criterion on payoffs; and compensation, which requires the norm to be
sufﬁciently responsive to variations in either person’s payoff.
In the case of (1), the shame from choosing a in the second stage is g(ϕ(a) 
maxb∈Aϕ(b)). This implies that even alternatives that are not chosen may matter
for the value of a set and that larger sets are not necessarily better. To see this, let
u(a) = 2a1, ϕ(a) = (a1 + 1)(a2 + 1),a n dg(x y) = y − x,s ot h a tU({(10 1) (5 3)}) = 18,
U({(10 1)}) = 20,a n dU({(5 3)}) = 10. To permit such a ranking, we assume a version of
leftbetweenness,whichallowssmallersetstobepreferredoverlargersets. Theorem1es-
tablishes our most general representation, which captures the intuition discussed thus
far.
Representationssimilarto(1)arestudiedextensivelyintheliteratureontemptation,
starting with the work of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, henceforth GP), who consider pref-
erences over menus of lotteries and impose the independence axiom. Instead, our rep-
resentation is based on choice over less complicated, risk-free objects. This domain is
in line with that of our motivating examples. More importantly, imposing the indepen-
dence axiom is inappropriate in our context. For example, suppose that the normative
ranking of alternatives is symmetric. Then (10 0) is as good as (0 10). Independence
implies that any randomization over these two allocations is as good as either of them,
while intuition suggests that awarding $10 to either player with probability 0 5 would be
normatively best. In addition, the linearity implied by the independence axiom means
that the suggested second-stage choice correspondence satisﬁes the weak axiom of re-
vealed preferences (WARP); that is, the choice criterion is menu-independent. Contrary
to this, we argue that violations of WARP are plausible in our context. Our most general
representation (Theorem 1) does accommodate such violations.4
4In the context of temptation, Noor and Takeoka (2011) explore the connection between the inde-
pendence axiom and WARP , and suggest relaxations of the independence axiom that allow for a menu-
dependent choice. In Epstein and Kopylov (2007), the choice objects are menus of acts. They relax in-
dependence and characterize a functional form with a convex temptation utility. Independently of our
work, Olszewski (2011) studies preferences over subsets of a ﬁnite set of deterministic outcomes and ﬁnds
a representation where both choice and temptation are context-dependent.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Ashamed to be selﬁsh 103










This representation is axiomatized in Theorem 2. The representation puts strong re-
strictions on the structure of shame-driven preferences, to the extent that second-stage
choice alone does not reveal anything about the normative ranking. That is, without
knowing the DM’s preferences over menus, one cannot distinguish between a standard
DM and a DM who is susceptible to shame.
We further specify the DM’s norm by assuming that it satisﬁes independent norma-
tive contributions: the contribution of raising one player’s monetary payoff to the nor-
mative value of an allocation does not depend on the level of the other player’s payoff.
With this additional assumption, Theorem 3 establishes that there are two positive, in-
creasing, and continuous utility functions, v1 and v2, evaluated in the payoff to the DM
and the recipient, respectively, such that the value of their product represents the norm,
ϕ(a) = v1(a1)v2(a2). Thus, the normatively best alternative within a set of alternatives
canbecharacterizedastheNashbargainingsolution(Nash1950)ofanassociatedgame.
Since the utility functions used to generate this game are subjective, so is the norm.
Example. In representation (1), let u(a) = 2a1, ϕ(a) = v1(a1)v2(a2) = (a1 + 1)(a2 + 1),
and g(x y)= y−x. IntheexperimentbyDanaetal.mentionedabove,onlywholedollar
amounts are possible allocations. The set A ={ (10 0) (9 1) (8 2)     (0 10)} then de-
scribes the dictator game. The set A induces an imaginary bargaining game where the
disagreement point gives zero utility to each player. According to the Nash bargaining
solution, (5 5) is the outcome of the bargaining game. Its normative value is 6 · 6 = 36.
To trade off shame with selﬁshness, the DM chooses the alternative that maximizes the
sum 2a1 +(a1 +1)(a2 +1),w h i c hi s(6 4). Its normative value is 7·5 = 35 and the shame
from choosing it equals 1.H e n c eU(A)= 11. From the singleton set B ={ (9 0)},w h i c h
corresponds to the exit option in the experiment, the choice is trivial and U(B)= 18.
This example illustrates both the trade-off the DM faces when choosing from a nonde-
generate menu and the reason why she might prefer a smaller menu. ♦
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model and
a representation that captures the interaction of the selﬁsh and the normative rankings
through shame. Section 3 isolates a choice criterion from the choice situation. Section 4
further speciﬁes the normative ranking. Section 5 concludes by pointing out connec-
tions to existing literature. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The model
For some k ∈ R ∪{ − ∞ } ,l e tX = (k ∞) be an open interval of monetary prizes.5 Let K
be the set of all ﬁnite subsets of X2. Any element A ∈ K is a ﬁnite set of alternatives.
5Whenever k<0, R+ ⊂ X.I np a r t i c u l a r ,X = R for k =− ∞.104 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
A typical alternative a = (a1 a2) is a payoff pair, where a1 is the private payoff for the
DM and a2 is the private payoff allocated to the (potentially anonymous) other player,
the recipient. Endow K with the topology generated by the Hausdorff metric, which is
deﬁned for any pair of nonempty sets, A B∈ K,a s













where d:X2 → R+ is the standard Euclidean distance.
Let   be a binary relation over K. The symmetric (∼) and asymmetric ( ) parts of  
are deﬁned in the usual way. Our ﬁrst two axioms on   are standard.
Axiom P1 (Weak order). The relation   is complete and transitive.
Axiom P2 (Continuity). The relation   is continuous.
T h ec h o i c eo fam e n uA ∈ K is not observed by the recipient, whereas the choice
from any menu is. We call the impact this observation has on choice shame. The next
axiom captures the idea that shame is a mental cost, which is invoked by unchosen
alternatives.
Axiom P3 (Strong left betweenness). If A   B,t h e nA   A ∪ B.F u r t h e r ,i f A   B and
there exists C such that A∪C   A∪B ∪C,t h e nA   A∪B.
We assume that adding unchosen alternatives to a set can only increase shame.
Therefore, no alternative is more appealing when chosen from A ∪ B than when cho-
sen from one of the smaller sets, A or B.H e n c e ,A   B implies A   A ∪B.6 The second
part of the axiom requires that if additional alternatives add to the shame incurred by
the original choice from a menu A ∪ C, then they must also add to the shame incurred
by any choice from the smaller menu A. This latter requirement rules out, for example,
a situation in which shame sets in only after two allocations are sufﬁciently different
according to, say, the Euclidean distance on X2.
Definition 1. We say that the DM is susceptible to shame if there exist A and B such
that A   A∪B.
Shame refers to some personal norm that determines what the appropriate choice
should have been. Accordingly, we deﬁne an induced binary relation, “normatively bet-
ter than.”
Definition 2. If the DM is susceptible to shame, then we say that the DM deems b to
benormativelybetterthana,writtenb  n a,if∃A ∈ K witha ∈ A,suchthatA   A∪{b}.7
6This is the left betweenness axiom. It appears in Dekel et al. (2009).
7The notion of normatively better than is analogous to “more tempting than” in Gul and Pesendorfer
(2005).Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Ashamed to be selﬁsh 105
The relationship A   A ∪{ b} implies that b adds to the shame incurred by the orig-
inal choice in A.I nt h i sc a s e ,b is normatively better than any alternative in A and, in
particular, b  n a. The induced relations  n and ∼n are deﬁned as
a  n b ⇔ b  n a
a ∼n b ⇔ both b  n a and a  n b 
Some of the axioms below are imposed on  n rather than on   and are labeled by
N instead of P . Because  n is an induced binary relation, N axioms are implicit axioms
on  ;  n is only an expositional device.8 The N axioms capture basic features of the
norm that we assume throughout. Making those assumptions directly on  n and moti-
vating them in that context is natural.
Axiom N1 (Ranking). The relation  n is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary
relation.
Axiom N1 rules out situations in which there are two alternatives, a and b,a n dt w o
menus, A and B,w i t h{a b}⊂A ∩ B,s u c ht h a ta contributes to shame in A and b
contributes to shame in B. If this were the case, then we would have A \{ a} A and
B\{b} B, which means, in contradiction to the asymmetry of  n, that both b  n a and
a  n b. This implies that the normative value of allocations is menu-independent and,
furthermore, that multiple alternatives on a menu cannot jointly contribute to shame.
Instead, only one alternative in each menu, one of the normatively best, is responsible
for shame.
Axiom N2 (Pareto). If b ≥ a and b  = a,t h e nb  n a.
This axiom states that an alternative with higher payoffs to both individuals is nor-
matively better. In other words, the subjective norm must have some concern for
efﬁciency.
Axiom N3 (Compensation). For all a, b, there exist x, y such that both (a1 x) n (b1 b2)
and (y a2)  n (b1 b2).
This axiom implies that any variation in the level of one person’s payoff can always
be compensated by appropriate variation in the level of the other person’s payoff. In
particular, Axiom N3 requires  n never to be satiated in either payoff.
The next axiom concerns the DM’s preferences over singleton sets. A singleton set is
a degenerate menu that contains only one feasible allocation. Since degenerate menus
leave the DM with no choice to be made under observation, choosing between two sin-
gletonsetsrevealstheDM’sprivaterankingoftheallocations. Althoughtheprivaterank-
ing of allocations might incorporate other-regarding preferences (such as altruism), we
8SinceforthestandarddecisionmakeritisneverthecasethatA   A∪B,sheisnotsusceptibletoshame.
Therefore, we cannotinfer anything abouther perceivednorm, and theN axioms putno restrictions on her
choice behavior.106 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
assume the DM to be more selﬁsh in private: if alternative a gives higher payoffs to the
DM than alternative b and is also normatively better, then a must be preferred to b in
private.
Axiom P4 (Selﬁshness). If a1 >b 1 and a  n b,t h e n{a} { b}.9 10
Definition 3. Letf and h be two functions on X2. We say that h is more selﬁsh than f
if for all a and for all  1 and  2 such that (a1 − 1 a2 − 2) ∈ X2,
(i) h(a) = h(a1 − 1 a2 + 2) implies f(a) ≤ f(a1 − 1 a2 + 2)
(ii) h(a) = h(a1 + 1 a2 − 2) implies f(a) ≥ f(a1 + 1 a2 − 2) with strict inequality
for at least one pair  1,  2.
Deﬁnition 3 is the discrete version of the requirement that the slope of a level curve
of h in the (a1 a2) plane is, at any point, weakly greater than that of f.11
Definition 4. A function ϕ:X2 → R is called a subjective norm function if it is strictly
increasingandsatisﬁessupx∈X ϕ(x y) > ϕ(b)andsupx∈X ϕ(y x) > ϕ(b)forally ∈ X and
b ∈ X2.
It is clear that if  n satisﬁes Axioms N1–N3, then any function ϕ:X2 → R that repre-
sents it should be a subjective norm function.
Theorem 1. Relations   and  n satisfy Axioms P1–P4 and N1–N3, respectively, if and
only if there exist (i) a continuous subjective norm function ϕ, (ii) a continuous function
u:X2 → R, which is weakly increasing and more selﬁsh than ϕ, and (iii) a continuous
function g:X2 ×ϕ(X2) → R, which is strictly increasing in its second argument and sat-











represents   and ϕ represents  n.
9Coupled with continuity (Axiom P2), Axiom P4 implies that if a1 >b 1 and a ∼n b,t h e n{a} { b}.T h a ti s ,
among equally good alternatives according to the normative ranking, the DM weakly prefers the one that
gives her the highest private payoff.
10Deﬁnition 2 (of  n) implies that if, in fact, a ∼n b, then the false hypothesis that a  n b cannot be
refuted in a ﬁnite number of observations, as one would have to establish that there exists no menu B
with b ∈ B,s u c ht h a tB   B ∪{ a}. This renders the negative transitivity part of Axiom N1 non-refutable
whenever the violation involves indifference. Accepting Axiom N1, Axiom P4,w h i c hr e l a t e s  and  n,i s
refutable. Axiom N2 can be separated into a weak version (in which the implication is of the  n type),
whichisrefutable,andanaxiomthatrequiresthatindifferencecurvesarenot“thick,”whichisnotrefutable.
Axiom N3 containsanexistentialquantiﬁerandhenceisnotrefutableindependentlyof theinduced nature
of  n.
11If h and f were differentiable and the inequalities in both items (i) and (ii) were strict, then the con-
dition would be (f1/f2)(a)<( h 1/h2)(a) for all a,w h e r efi denotes the partial derivative of f with respect
to its ith component. In this case, the deﬁnition of more selﬁsh than coincides with the deﬁnition of less
altruistic than in Cox et al. (2008).Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Ashamed to be selﬁsh 107
Theorem 1 provides a representation of the DM’s normative ranking based on re-
vealed preferences. This should help the empirical quest to understand people’s per-
ception of social norms. The representation captures the tension between the DM’s im-
pulse to choose the allocation she prefers in private and her desire to minimize shame.
There are at most two essential alternatives within a set, to be interpreted as the “cho-
sen” and the “normatively best” alternative, a and b, respectively. For the latter, only
its normative value, ϕ(b), matters for its impact on the set’s value. Since g(a ϕ(a)) = 0
and g is strictly increasing in its second argument, g(a ϕ(b)) > 0 whenever ϕ(a)<ϕ ( b),
whereϕ(a)isthenormativevalueofthechosenalternative. Therepresentationcaptures
the idea of shame being an emotional cost that emerges whenever the normatively best
availableallocationisnotchosen. Thepropertiesofthefunction g andthe max operator
inside imply that thesecond term is always a cost (nonpositive). The other max operator
implies that the DM’s utility never lies below u(b), the utility of the normatively best al-
location. Put differently, any deviations by the DM from choosing the normatively best
allocationarein herown favor. Therefore, it isbeingselﬁsh, and notbeingtoogenerous,
that triggers shame. The magnitude of shame may depend on the chosen allocation.
We conclude this section by mentioning the main steps of the proof. We provide
intuition only for the most instructive steps. Continuity of   implies that  n is also a
continuous preference relation. Therefore, they can both be represented by continu-
ous functions, U :K → R and ϕ:X2 → R, respectively. The combination of Axioms N2
and N3 implies that ϕ is a subjective norm function. Note that by the asymmetry part
of Axiom N1,i f{a} { a b},t h e n{a b} { b}. We generalize this observation to show
that the combination of Axioms P3 and N1 implies GP’s set betweenness (SB) property:
A   B implies A   A ∪ B   B. GP demonstrate that imposing SB on preferences over
sets makes every set indifferent to a certain subset of it, which includes at most two
elements. Hence we conﬁne our attention to a subset of the domain that includes all
sets with cardinality no greater than 2. A key step for the remainder of the proof is
to show that u is more selﬁsh than ϕ and, in particular, that for any a,t h e r ei sar e -
gion in which part (ii) of Deﬁnition 3 is satisﬁed with strict inequality. To see this, note
that if the inequality is never strict, then by Axiom P4, {a} { b} implies a  n b.S u p -
pose that {c} { a c} for some c.T h e n b y S B , {c} { a}, which implies that c  n a or
{c}   {a c}. Therefore, {a c} { c} for all c. We generalize this conclusion to show that
C ∪{ a} C for all C, which implies that a  n c for all c and, in particular, for c < a,
violating Axiom N2. After establishing that u is more selﬁsh than ϕ, we show that any
set A is indifferent to some two-element subset of it that includes one of the norma-
tively best allocations in A. Furthermore, only the normative value, ϕ, of this alterna-
tive affects the value of A. Last, we show that the shame function, g, must be strictly
increasing in its second component. To see this, assume to the contrary that g(a ϕ)
is positive and constant on some interval [ϕ ϕ].T h e n w e c a n ﬁ n db and b  such that
ϕ(b) = ϕ, ϕ(b ) = ϕ,a n d{a} { a b}∼{ a b } { b b }.B yS B ,{a b}∼{ a b b
 }. Since u is
more selﬁsh than ϕ,t h e r ee x i s t sc such that {c} { a}, {c} { c b } { b }, {c b } { a b },
and ϕ(c) ∈ (ϕ(b) ϕ(b )).T h e n {c}∼{ a b c} { a b b  c} and by the second part of
Axiom P3,w eh a v e{a b} { a b b }, which is a contradiction.108 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
3. A second-stage choice ranking
In many situations, second-stage choice may also be observed by the experimenter.
















right behavior but considers large deviations from the norm to be unacceptable. For ex-
ample, she might choose (8 2) from the set {(10 0) (8 2) (5 5)} and (10 0) from the set
{(10 0) (8 2)}; while she ﬁnds her preferred allocation to be (10 0) when the norma-
tively best available alternative is (8 2), choosing it becomes too costly in the presence
of (5 5), making (8 2) the best compromise. This type of violation of the weak axiom of
revealed preferences (WARP) is plausible when shame is taken into account. That said,
it is also plausible that the DM’s second-stage choice rule is set-independent, that is, it
satisﬁes WARP .
The next axiom strengthens the role of the normative value of the chosen alterna-
tive in determining shame: the greater the normative value of the DM’s choice, the less
shame she feels.
Axiom P5 (Mitigating shame). Suppose {a} { a b} { b}.I f{a }∼{ a} and a   n a,t h e n
{a  b} { a b}.
For any set of two allocations {a b}, we interpret the preference ordering {a} 
{a b} { b} as an indication of a discrepancy between what the DM chooses (a)a n d
the alternative she deems to be normatively best (b), which causes her choice to bear
shame. This shame, however, is not enough to make her choose b. Axiom P5 then im-
plies that only the normative value of the chosen alternative matters for its impact on
shame.
Given Axioms P1–P5 and N1–N3, an additional assumption is equivalent to a set-
independent choice ranking.
Axiom P6 (Consistency). If {a a  b} { a  b}, thenforany b ,e i t h e r{a a  b } { a  b } or
{b } { a  b } 
The qualiﬁer says that the addition of a improves the value of {a  b}, which implies
that a is the (unique) choice from {a a  b}. The axiom requires that a improves any
other (two-element) set that includes a , unless the third alternative, b  is sufﬁciently
good. In terms of the suggested second-stage choice, the axiom implies that if a is ever
theuniquechoicewhen a  isavailable,then a  isnevertheuniquechoiceinthefaceof a.
Theorem 2. Relations   and  n satisfy Axioms P1–P6 and N1–N3 respectively, if and
only if there exist a continuous subjective norm function ϕ and a continuous functionTheoretical Economics 7 (2012) Ashamed to be selﬁsh 109
u:X2 → R, which is weakly increasing and more selﬁsh than ϕ, such that the function






represents   and ϕ represents  n.
The representation in Theorem 2 suggests a choice criterion that is independent of
the choice problem: the DM’s behavior is governed by maximizing ψ(a) = u(a) + ϕ(a).
The value of the set is reduced by maxb∈Aϕ(b), a term that depends solely on the nor-
matively best alternative in the set. Grouping the terms differently reveals the trade-off




Note that now shame takes an additively separable form and depends only on the nor-
mative value of both alternatives.
We conclude this section by remarking on the identiﬁability of the normative rank-
ing.12 A natural question is, To what extent can one elicit the DM’s normative rank-
ing based solely on choice from menus. Consider the induced binary relation “b al-
ters choice in the face of a”d e ﬁ n e da sb  a a if and only if there is A such that
a ∈ A, b / ∈ C(A ∪{ b}),a n dC(A)  = C(A ∪{ b}). It follows from the deﬁnition of the
choice correspondence (2) that if the addition of b changes the choice from A,t h e n
b ∈ argmaxb ∈A∪{b}ϕ(b ) and a / ∈ argmaxb ∈A∪{b}ϕ(b ). Therefore, a second-stage viola-
tion of WARP partially identiﬁes the DM’s normative ranking: b  a a implies b  n a.
Furthermore, enough violations of WARP fully identify  n.13 If there are no violations
of WARP , then observing the DM’s choice of menus is necessary to elicit the normative
ranking of any two alternatives. This is the case where Theorem 2 applies.
4. Specifying a normative ranking
We now impose another axiom on  n to further specify the DM’s subjective norm. The
axiom is known in the literature as the hexagon condition (Karni and Safra 1998). In our
context, it asserts that the contribution of one person’s marginal payoff to the normative
value of an allocation cannot depend on the initial payoff levels.
AxiomN4 (Independentnormativecontributions). If(a1 a2) ∼n (b1 b2)and(a 
1 a2) ∼n
(a1 b2) ∼n (b1 b 
2),t h e n(a 
1 b2) ∼n (a1 b 
2).
12The remark is not speciﬁc to our model: it generalizes to all models that study preferences over sets of
alternatives.
13The relation  n is uniquely identiﬁed from second-stage choice if and only if  a is a continuous weak
orderthatsatisﬁestheParetoproperty. Toseethis,notethat(2)andcompletenessof a implythatifb ∼n a,
then b ∼a a. Take any b  n a.B yAxiom N2,t h e r ee x i s tc > d such that c ∼n b  n a ∼n d.B yP a r e t o ,c  a d
and by transitivity, b  a a. In the text we argue that the other direction is also true, hence b  n a ⇔ b  a a.110 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Figure 1. Independent normative contributions.
This axiom is illustrated in Figure 1.I fa1 = a 
1 or b2 = b 
2, this axiom is implied by
Axioms N1 and N2, and the continuity of  n.F o r a1  = a 
1 and b2  = b 
2, the statement
is subtler. Consider ﬁrst a stronger assumption, which is also known as the Thomsen
condition (Krantz et al. 1971).
Axiom N 
4 (Strong independent normative contributions). The relationships (a1 a2) ∼n
(b1 b2) and (a 
1 a2) ∼n (b1 b 
2) imply (a 
1 b2) ∼n (a1 b 
2).
To motivate this axiom, assume that the DM constructs her subjective norm based
on two perceived utility functions over monetary payoffs (not over allocations): one for
herself and one for the recipient. At the same time, she either cannot or is not willing
to compare their relative intensities. In other words, she does not make interpersonal
comparisons of utilities.14 The qualiﬁer in Axiom N 
4 establishes that the DM considers
the contribution of changing her own payoff from a1 to a 
1 given the allocation (a1 a2)
to be the same as that of changing the recipient’s payoff from b2 to b 
2 given (b1 b2). Ax-
iom N 
4 then states that starting from the allocation (a1 b2), changing a1 to a 
1 should
again be as favorable as changing b2 to b 
2.T h i si st h ee s s e n c eo findependent normative
contributions. The stronger qualiﬁer (b1 b 
2) ∼n (a1 b2) ∼n (a 
1 a2) in Axiom N4 weak-
ens the axiom. For example, the normative ranking (a1 a2)  n (b1 b2) if and only if




Safra (1998) demonstrate that the weaker condition, Axiom N4,i m p l i e sAxiom N 
4 in the
context of their axioms. The next theorem is based on those results.
Theorem3. Therelation n iscontinuousandsatisﬁesAxiomsN1–N4 ifandonlyifthere
are continuous, strictly increasing, and unbounded functions v1 v2:X → R++,s u c ht h a t
ϕ(a) = v1(a1)v2(a2) represents  n.
This representation suggests an appealing interpretation of the normative ranking
the DM is concerned about: she behaves as if she has in mind two positive, increasing,
14This argument resembles the idea, common in social choice theory, that interpersonal utility compar-
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and unbounded utility functions on X: one for herself and one for the recipient. By
mapping the alternatives within each set into the associated utility space, any choice set
induces a ﬁnite bargaining game, where the imaginary disagreement point corresponds
to zero utility payoffs.15 The DM then identiﬁes the normatively best alternative within
a set as the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) of the game. Moreover, all alternatives can
be normatively ranked according to the same functional, the Nash product.
One justiﬁcation of the NBS as the normative best allocation is related to Gauthier’s
(1986)principle of“moral byagreement”: trying toassesswhatis normative, butﬁnding
herself unable, or unwilling, to compare utilities across individuals, the DM might refer
to the prediction of a symmetric mechanism for generating allocations. For example,
the DM might ask what the allocation would be if both she and the recipient bargain
over the division of the surplus. To answer this question, she does not need to assume
theintensitiesofthetwopreferences. Thisisaproceduralinterpretationthatisnotbuilt
on the axioms; the DM is not ashamed of payoffs, but of using her stronger position to
distribute the gains. The intuitive and possibly descriptive appeal of the NBS in many
bargaining situations then makes it normatively appealing to the DM.16
5. Related literature
Other-regarding preferences are considered extensively in economic literature. In par-
ticular, inequality aversion, as studied by Fehr and Schimdt (1999), is based on an ob-
jective function with a similar structure to the representation of second-stage choice
in Theorem 2. Both works attach a cost to any deviation from choosing the normatively
bestalternative. InFehrandSchmidt’swork,thenormativelybestallocationisanyequal
split and need not be feasible. In our work, the normatively best available allocation is
responsibleforshame. Thedependencyofthenormativelybestallocationonthechoice
situation allows us to distinguish observed from unobserved choice.
The idea that there may be a discrepancy between the DM’s preference to behave
“pro-socially” and her desire to be viewed as behaving pro-socially is not new to eco-
nomic literature. For a model thereof, see Bénabou and Tirole (2006).
Neilson (2009) is motivated by the same experimental evidence. He also considers
menus of allocations as objects of choice. Neilson does not axiomatize a representa-
tion result, but qualitatively relates the two aspects of shame that also underlie the set
betweenness property in our work: the DM might prefer a smaller menu over a larger
menu either because avoiding shame compels her to be generous when choosing from
the larger menu or because being selﬁsh when choosing from the larger menu bears the
cost of shame.
Thestructureofourrepresentationresemblestherepresentationofpreferenceswith
self-control under temptation, as axiomatized in GP. They study preferences over sets
15Since v1 and v2 are positive, the imaginary disagreement point does not correspond to any allocation
in our domain.
16The descriptive value of the NBS has been tested empirically. For a discussion, see Davis and Holt
(1993, pp. 247–255). Further, multiple seemingly natural implementations of NBS have been proposed
(Nash 1953, Osborne and Rubinstein 1994).112 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)






with uGP and vGP both linear in the probabilities and where A is now a set of lotteries. In
their context, uGP represents the commitment and vGP represents the temptation rank-
ing. While the two works yield representations with a similar structure, their domains—
and therefore the axioms—are different. They impose the independence axiom and in-
difference to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. This allows them to identify the
representationabovethatconsistsoftwoexpectedutilityfunctionals. Theobjectsinour
work,incontrast,aresetsofmonetaryallocations,andthereisnouncertainty. Evenifwe
did consider risky prospects, we argue in the Introduction that imposing the indepen-
denceaxiomisnotplausible. However,oneofGP’saxiomsisthesetbetweennessaxiom,
A   B ⇒ A   A ∪ B   B. We show that our axioms, strong left betweenness (Axiom P3)
and normative ranking (Axiom N1) imply set betweenness. Hence, GP’s Lemma 2 can be
employed, allowing us to conﬁne attention to sets with only two elements.
EpsteinandKopylov(2007)studypreferencesovermenusofAnscombeandAumann
acts. Their representation captures the intuition that people become pessimistic as the
time of consumption approaches. By treating state i as the payoff to player i and by
redeﬁning the mixture operator as convex combinations of allocations instead of the
usual convex combinations of acts, their axioms can be applied to our domain.17 While
a version of their main representation can accommodate the speciﬁc dictator game ex-
periment of Dana et al., the two works differ signiﬁcantly. Applying Epstein and Kopy-
lov’s Axiom 7 (constant acts cannot be tempted) to our context implies that the DM pri-
vately weakly prefers an allocation that favors the recipient over an allocation that gives
the same amount to both players if the two are equally good according to the norma-
tive ranking. If this preference is strict, it contradicts the central notion that the DM is
ashamed to be selﬁsh, which is captured by the assumption that she is more selﬁsh in
private (Axiom P4). Put differently, the two models qualitatively disagree—unless the
normative ranking coincides with the private ranking—once the recipient gets higher
payoff than the DM. In addition, due to the deﬁnition of the mixture operation on R2,
their axioms restrict the private ranking to be represented by a linear function, u,a n d
the social trade-off function, ϕ, to be piecewise linear with a kink on the main diago-
nal. Regardless whether of such rankings are reasonable, many other private and nor-
mative rankings are excluded, which deﬁes the purpose of eliciting these rankings from
behavior.
Empirically, the assumption that only two elements of a choice set matter for the
magnitude of shame (the normatively best available alternative and the chosen alterna-
tive) is clearly simplifying: Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger (2008) observe that dicta-
tors choose to make much smaller transfers when their choice set includes an unattrac-
tive lottery. In other words, the availability of an unattractive allocation seems to lessen
the incentive to share.
17We thank a referee for suggesting this connection between the two models.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Ashamed to be selﬁsh 113
Last, it is necessary to qualify our leading example: the growing experimental evi-
dence on the effect of (anonymous) observation on the level of giving in dictator games
is by no means conclusive. Behavior tends to depend crucially on surroundings, like the
social proximity of the group of subjects and the phrasing of the instructions, as, for ex-
ample, Bolton et al. (1998), Burnham (2003), and Haley and Fessler (2005)r e c o r d .W h i l e
supported by the body of evidence mentioned in the Introduction, our interpretation
is in contrast to evidence collected by Koch and Normann (2008), who claim that altru-
istic behavior persists at an almost unchanged level when observability is credibly re-
duced. Similarly, JohannessonandPersson(2000)ﬁnd thatincompleteanonymity—not
observability—is what keeps people from being selﬁsh. Ultimately, experiments aimed
at eliciting a norm share the same problem: since people use different (and potentially
contradictory) norms in different contexts, it is unclear whether the laboratory environ-
ment triggers a different set of norms than would other situations. Frohlich et al. (2001)
point out that money might become a measure of success rather than a direct asset in
the competition-like laboratory environment, such that the norm might be “do well”
rather than “do not be selﬁsh.”18 Miller (1999) suggests that the phrasing of instructions
might determine which norm is invoked. For example, the reason that Koch and Nor-
mann do not ﬁnd an effect of observability might be that their thorough explanation of
anonymity induces a change in the regime of norms, in effect telling people “be ratio-
nal,” which might be interpreted as “be selﬁsh.” Then being observed might have no




ProofofTheorem1.L e t U :K → Rbeacontinuousfunctionthatrepresents .W i t h -
out loss of generality, we assume that U is bounded from below. Deﬁne u(a) ≡ U({a}).
Axiom P2 implies that  n is continuous and hence admits a continuous representa-
tion. Let ϕ:X2 → R be a continuous function that represents  n.B y Axiom N2, ϕ
is strictly increasing. Because  n is continuous, Axiom N3 immediately implies that if
(a1 a2)  n (b1 b2), then there are x and y such that (a1 x)∼n (b1 b2) ∼n (y a2).I na l l
that follows, we use this stronger version of Axiom N3 without further discussion.
Claim 1 (Right betweenness). The implication A   B ⇒ A∪B   B holds.
Proof. There are two cases to consider:
Case 1. For all a ∈ A, ∃b ∈ B such that b  n a.L e tA ={ a1 a2     aN} and C0 = B.
Deﬁne Cn = Cn−1 ∪{an} for n = 1 2     N. According to Axiom N1,f o ra l lan there exists
b ∈ B such that an  n b. By the deﬁnition of  n, Cn−1   Cn. By negative transitivity of  ,
C0   CN or A∪B   B.
18Surely the opposite is also conceivable: subjects might be particularly keen to be selﬂess when the
experimenter observes their behavior. This example is just meant to draw attention to the difﬁculties faced
by experimenters in the context of norms.114 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Case 2. There exists a ∈ A such that a  n b ∀b ∈ B.L e tB ={ b1 b2     bM}.D e ﬁ n e
C0 = A and Cm = Cm−1 ∪{bm} for m = 1 2     M. By the deﬁnition of  n and Axiom N1,
∀C such that a ∈ C, C   C ∪{ bm}.H e n c e , Cm−1   Cm. By negative transitivity of  ,
C0   CM or A∪B   A   B,h e n c eA∪B   B.  
Combining Claim 1 with Axiom P3 guarantees set betweenness (SB): A   B ⇒ A  
A ∪ B   B. Having established set betweenness, we can apply GP’s Lemma 2, which
states that any set is indifferent to a speciﬁc two-element subset of it.
Lemma 1 (GP’s Lemma 2). If   satisﬁes SB, then for any ﬁnite set A, there exist
a b ∈ A such that A ∼{ a b}, (a b) solves maxa ∈Aminb ∈AU({a  b }) and (b a) solves
minb ∈Amaxa ∈AU({a  b }).
We now use SB, Lemma 1, Axiom P4, and the monotonicity of ϕ to show that u is
more selﬁsh than ϕ according to Deﬁnition 3.
Claim 2. The function u is weakly increasing and more selﬁsh than ϕ.
Proof. First, suppose that u is not weakly increasing. Then there is b > a,s u c ht h a t
u(a)>u ( b) and, therefore, {a} { b}.B u tb > a implies that both b  n a by Axiom P2 and
b1 >a 1, a contradiction to Axiom P4.
To show that item (i) in Deﬁnition 3 holds, assume that u(a) = u(a1 − 1 a2 + 2),
which implies that {a}∼{ a1 −  1 a2 +  2}. Since a1 −  1 <a 1,i tm u s tb et h a t
(a1 −  1 a2 +  2)  n a or ϕ(a1 −  1 a2 +  2) ≥ ϕ(a). The weak inequality in item (ii)
is shown similarly. Let U (a) := {a :u(a )>u ( a)} and U n(a) := {a :ϕ(a )>ϕ ( a)}.T o
establish that one inequality in item (ii) must be strict, we show that we cannot have a
for which u(a) = u(a1 + 1 a2 − 2) implies ϕ(a) = ϕ(a1 + 1 a2 − 2) for all  1 and  2.
Suppose it was the case. Then by Axiom P4, U (a) ⊆ U n(a).
Step 1. There is no c such that {c} { c a}.
To prove Step 1, suppose instead thatthereexists c such that {c} { c a}.T h e nb yS B ,
{c} { a} and since U (a) ⊆ U n(a), c  n a. Therefore, by deﬁnition, {c}   {c a},w h i c h
is a contradiction.
Step 2. If there is no c such that {c} { c a}, then there is no C such that C   C ∪{a}.
To prove Step 2, suppose instead that C   C ∪{ a} for some C.B y S B , t h e r e e x i s t
c c  c   ∈ C such that C ∼{ c  c  } and C ∪{ a}∼{ c a} (c, c ,a n dc   need not be distinct).
Without loss of generality, assume that c   is the minimizer in C (clearly a is the mini-
mizer in C ∪{ a}). Then {c } { c  c  }∼C   C ∪{ a}∼{ c a} { c  a},w h e r et h el a s t  is
because c is one of the maximizers in C ∪{ a}. By transitivity, {c } { c  a},w h i c hi sa
contradiction.
Hence, by Deﬁnition 1, a  n c for all c and, in particular, for c = (a1 − ε a2 − ε),
contradicting the strict Pareto criterion (Axiom N2).  
Claim 3. (i) The implication [ϕ(a)<ϕ ( b) and {a} { b}] ⇔ {a} { a b} holds.
(ii) The implication [ϕ(a)<ϕ ( b) and {b} { a}] ⇒ {b}∼{ a b} holds.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Ashamed to be selﬁsh 115
(iii) The implication [ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) and {a} { b}] ⇒ {a}∼{ a b} { b} holds.
Proof.( i )I fϕ(b)>ϕ ( a), then there exists A such that a ∈ A and A   A ∪{ b}.A s
{a} { b},b yAxiom P3 {a} { a b}.C o n v e r s e l y ,i f{a} { a b},t h e nb yS B ,{a} { b},a n d
by deﬁnition, b  n a or ϕ(a)<ϕ ( b).
(ii) If {b} { a},t h e nb yS B ,{b} { a b}. Since ϕ(b)>ϕ ( a), Axiom N1 implies that
there is no B such that b ∈ B and B   B ∪{a}.T h u s ,{b}∼{ a b}.
(iii) Relationship {a} { b} implies by SB that {a} { a b}.A s ϕ(a) = ϕ(b),p a r t( i )
implies that {a} { a b} and, therefore, {a}∼{ a b}.  





U({a  b }) 
(By Lemma 1, (b∗(A) a∗(A)) also solves minb ∈Amaxa ∈AU({a  b }).)
Claim 4. There exists b ∈ argmaxa ∈Aϕ(a ) such that A ∼{ a b} for some a ∈ A and
b∗(A) = b.
Proof. Assume not. Then there exist a and c such that {a c}∼A and (a c) =
(a∗(A) b∗(A)). Therefore,
{a b} { a c}∼{ a b c}∼A ∀b ∈ argmax
a ∈A
ϕ(a ) 
where the ﬁrst strict inequality is because b is not one of the minimizers. But {a b} 
{a b c} implies c  n b, which is a contradiction.  
For the remainder of the proof, let In(ϕ) := {b :ϕ(b ) = ϕ}.D e ﬁ n e
Y(a ϕ)={ b  ∈ In(ϕ):{a} { a b } { b }} 
We make the following four observations.
O1. The relationships {a} { a b} { b}, {a} { a c},a n db  n c imply {a c} { a b}.
O2. The relationships {a} { a b} { b}, {a} { a c} { c},a n db ∼n c imply {a c}∼
{a b}.
O3. The relationships b ∈ Y(a ϕ), {b} { b },a n db  ∼n b imply b  ∈ Y(a ϕ).
O4. If {a} { a b} { b}, {b } { b},a n db  ∼n b, then either {a b }∼{ a b} { b } or
{a b }∼{ b } { a b}.
To verify these observations, suppose ﬁrst that O1 does not hold. Then {a b} { a c}
and {a b} { b}.T h e n b y S B , {a b} { a b c} and, therefore, c  n b,w h i c hi sac o n -
tradiction. If O2 does not hold, then either {a c} { a b} and {a c} { c},w h i c hi m -
ply, using SB, that {a c} { a b c},o r{a b} { a c} and {a b} { b}, which imply, again116 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
using SB, that {a b} { a b c}. In both cases, we get a contradiction to b ∼n c.N e x t
suppose that O3 does not hold. Then either {b }∼{ a b } or {a}∼{ a b }.I n t h e ﬁ r s t
case, {a} { a b} { b} { b }∼{ a b },a n db yS B ,{b} { b b } and, applying SB again,
{b} { a b b }.B u t t h e n {a b} { a b b }, contradicting b  ∼n b. In the second case,
{a}∼{ a b } { a b} { b} { b } and, using SB twice, {a b}∼{ a b b }, which is again
a contradiction to b  ∼n b. To verify O4, assume {a b } { b }.T h e n , b y Claim 3(i),
{a} { a b } { b }, and by observation O2, {a b }∼{ a b}. If, alternatively, {a b }∼{ b },
thenif{a b} { a b },thecombinationof{a b} { b}andSBimplythat{a b} { a b b },
which is a contradiction to b  ∈ In(ϕ(b)). Note that we cannot have {b } { a b }.O t h e r -
wise, we would have a  n b  ∼n b  n a, which is a contradiction.
Deﬁne f :X2 ×X2 → R such that f(a b) = u(a)−   U(a b),w h e r e
  U :X2 ×X2 → R is a function satisfying19








  U(a  b ) 
By deﬁnition, we have f(a a) = 0 for every a ∈ X. Note as well that
{a} { a b}⇒f(a b)>0 
as otherwise we have























Next we claim that ϕ(b∗) summarizes the impact of b∗ on a two-element set.
Claim 5. There exists a function   U satisfying the condition speciﬁed above such that
f(a b) = g(a ϕ(b)) for some g:X2 × R → R, which is strictly increasing in its second
argument.
Proof.G i v e n b and c such that ϕ(b)>ϕ ( c), we show that for all a, f(a b)>f( a c) is
consistent with  .
We ﬁrst show that if ϕ(b) ≥ ϕ(a) ≥ ϕ(c),t h e nf(a b) ≥ 0 >f( a c) is consistent
with  , and if ϕ(a) ≥ ϕ(b)>ϕ ( c),t h e n0 ≥ f(a b)>f( a c) is consistent with  .T o
see this, we consider pairs (a b) and (a c), and identify the restrictions imposed by all
combinations of corresponding values of u and φ. Consider ﬁrst the pair (a b).
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(ii) Take u(a) ≤ u(b) and φ(b)>φ( a).B yClaim 3(ii), {b}∼{ a b}.B yt h ef o r m u l af o r
U({a b}), a sufﬁcient condition is that f(a b)>0 >f( b a).
(iii) Take u(a)>u ( b) and φ(b) = φ(a).B yClaim 3(iii), {a}∼{ a b} { b}.B yt h ef o r -
mula for U({a b}), a sufﬁcient condition is that f(a b) = 0 = f(b a).
(iv) Take u(a) ≤ u(b) and φ(b) = φ(a).B yClaim 3(ii), {b}∼{ a b}.B yt h ef o r m u l af o r
U({a b}), a sufﬁcient condition is that f(a b) = 0 = f(b a).
Similar calculations can be done for (a c) by replacing b with c.
Suppose φ(b) ≥ φ(a) ≥ φ(c). Then from cases (i)–(iv), f(a b) ≥ 0 ≥ f(a c).B u t
since one of the weak inequalities is strict, either f(a b)>0 or f(a c)<0 (or both),
hence indeed f(a b)>f( a c) is consistent with  . Suppose φ(a) ≥ φ(b)>φ( c).T h e n
0 ≥ f(a b)>f( a c) is consistent with   (that is, we can arbitrarily choose the values of
f(a b) and f(a c) as such).
Therefore, conﬁne attention to the case where ϕ(b)>ϕ ( c)>ϕ ( a).
If there is no b  ∈ In(ϕ(b)) with {a} { a b },t h e nf(a b)>f( a c) ≥ 0 is consistent
with  . Suppose there exists b  ∈ In(ϕ(b)) such that {a} { a b }.T h e r ea r et w oc a s e st o
consider.
Case 1. Suppose Y(a ϕ(b)) = ∅.L e tu := infa ∈X u(a ) (recall that U is chosen to be
bounded from below). Deﬁne f(a b) such that f(a b)>u ( a) − u.I f Y(a ϕ(c))  = ∅,
then f(a c)<u ( a) − u(c)<u ( a) − u <f( a b).I fY(a ϕ(c)) = ∅, then we can choose
f(a b)>max{u(a)−u f(a c)} so that f(a c)<f( a b) is consistent with  .
Case 2. Suppose Y(a ϕ(b))  = ∅.D e ﬁ n ef(a b) := f(a b ) for some b  ∈ Y(a ϕ(b)).
Note that by observation O2, f(a b ) = f(a b  ) ∀b  b   ∈ Y(a ϕ(b)).I fb   ∈ In(ϕ(b) but
b   / ∈ Y(a ϕ(b)), then, by observation O4, it must be that {b  }∼{ a b  }. The constraint is
thus f(a b  )>u ( a) − u(b  ). Using the deﬁnition above we have f(a b  ) = f(a b)>
u(a) − u(b)>u ( a) − u(b  ), hence the deﬁnition is consistent with  .B y Axiom N2
and continuity of  n,t h e r ee x i s t sc  ∈ In(c) with c 
1 <b  
1 for some b  ∈ Y(a ϕ(b)).T h e n
{b } { c } by Axiom P4. Claim 3(i) and observation O1 imply that {a} { a c } { a b } 
{b } { c }. Therefore, f(a b ) ≥ f(a c ). Note that if {a c} { a b},t h e nf(a b) ≥ f(a c)
isconsistentwith  ,evenifb / ∈ Y(a ϕ(b)) or c / ∈ Y(a ϕ(c)).I f{a b} { a c},thenobser-
vation O4 implies that {a b}∼{ b} and, therefore, f(a b) ≥ f(a c) is consistent with  .
We still need to argue that f(a b)  = f(a c). Consider a nontrivial interval [ϕ ϕ] with
ϕ(b) ∈[ ϕ ϕ], Y(a ϕ )  = ∅ for all ϕ  ∈[ ϕ ϕ], and a function g(a ϕ)that is constant on
[ϕ ϕ]. Choose b ∈ Y(a ϕ) and b  ∈ Y(a ϕ). By assumption, g(a ϕ(b)) = g(a ϕ(b )).
Suppose that f(a ·) ≡ g(a ϕ(·)).T h e n{a b}∼{ a b } b  and, by SB, {a b}∼{ a b b }.
By Claim 2,t h e r ee x i s t sc such that {c} { a}, {c} { c b } { b },a n d{c b } { a b }
(that is, u(c) − g(c ϕ(b )) > u(a) − g(a ϕ(b )) and ϕ(c) ∈ (ϕ(b) ϕ(b ))). But then
{c}∼{ a b c} { a b b  c} and by the second part of Axiom P3 {a b} { a b b },w h i c h
is a contradiction.
Hence, g mustbestrictlyincreasinginitssecondargumentwheneverstrictSBholds,
and can be chosen to be strictly increasing anywhere else.  
Let S := {(a ϕ):Y(a ϕ) = ∅}. Note that S is an open set.118 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Claim 6. There is g(a ϕ), which is continuous.
Proof.I fY(a ϕ) = ∅,t h e ng(a ϕ)= u(a) − U({a b}) for some b ∈ Y(a ϕ)is clearly
continuous. If Y(a ϕ)= ∅,t h e nϕ ≤ ϕ(a) implies g(a ϕ)≤ 0, while ϕ>ϕ ( a) implies
g(a ϕ)≥ u(a)−u(0). Deﬁne a switch point (  a   ϕ) to be a boundary point of S such that
there exists b∗ ∈ X2 with ϕ(b∗) =   ϕ.F o r  ϕ = ϕ(  a),d e ﬁ n eg(  a   ϕ) := 0 and for   ϕ>ϕ (   a),
deﬁne g(  a   ϕ) := u(  a)−infb∈In(  ϕ)u(b).
Consider a sequence {(an ϕn)}→(  a   ϕ) in S. Pick a sequence {bn } with bn  ∈
Y(an ϕn) ∀n.D e ﬁ n e {bn
1}={ min[k + 1/n bn 
1  b∗
1]}.D e ﬁ n e bn
2 to be a solution to
ϕ(bn
1 bn
2) = ϕn.B yA x i o m sN2 andN3,bn
2 iswelldeﬁned. NotethatbyobservationO3and
Axiom P4, bn = (bn
1 bn
2) ∈ Y(an ϕn).L a s t ,l e t   bn solve   bn
1 = bn
1 and ϕ(  bn) =   ϕ.W eh a v e
U({an bn}) = u(an) − g(an ϕn). If in the switch point   ϕ = ϕ(  a),t h e nU({  a   bn}) = u(  a).
By Axiom P2, U({an bn})−U({  a   bn}) →
n→∞
0,h e n c e
lim
n→∞
g(an ϕn) = lim
n→∞
[u(an)−u(  a)]=u(  a)−u(  a) = 0 = g(  a   ϕ) 
Ifattheswitchpoint   ϕ>ϕ (   a),thenU({  a   bn}) = u(  bn). Notethatforany  b ∈ In(  ϕ),ther e
exists N such that   bn
1 <   b1 for all n>N. Since u is more selﬁsh than ϕ, u(  bn)<u (   b)
for all n>N. This implies that limn→∞u(  bn) = infb∈In(  ϕ)u(b). By the same continuity
argument,
lim
n→∞g(an ϕn) = lim
n→∞[u(an)−u(  bn)]=u(  a)− inf
b∈In(  ϕ)
u(b) = g(  a   ϕ) 
For ϕ<ϕ ( a),l e tg(a ϕ)<0. This satisﬁes the constraint on f.S og can be continu-
ous in both arguments, increasing in ϕ, and such that for any sequence {(an ϕn)} in S,
with {(an ϕn)}→(  a   ϕ) ,w eh a v elimn→∞g(an ϕn) = 0.  










of   on K with the properties as speciﬁed in the theorem.
We now show the necessity of the axioms to the representation. The necessity of
Axioms P1 and P2 is obvious. We have already shown that if g is strictly increasing,
then Axiom P3 is satisﬁed. For the necessity of Axiom P4,l e tH(b) := {a:ϕ(a) ≥ ϕ(a)}∩
{a:a1 ≥ b1}. Sinceuismoreselﬁshthanϕandbothareincreasing, H(b) ⊆ U (b),hence
a ∈ H(b) implies u(a)>u ( b) or {a} { b}.F o rA x i o m sN1–N3, it is sufﬁcient to show that
if a  n c, then the representation provides a set C such that c ∈ C and C   C ∪{ a}.L e t
L n(a) := {a :ϕ(a )<ϕ ( a)}.B yDeﬁnition3(ii), L n(a)∩U (a)  = φ.T h e r ea r et w oc a s e s
to consider.
Case1. If c ∈ L n(a)∩U (a),t h e nmax{u(c)−g(c ϕ(a)) u(a)} <u ( c), whichimplies
that {c} { c a},s ot a k eC ={ c}.
Case 2. Suppose that d ∈ L n(a) ∩ L (a). The representation implies that there is
c ∈ L n(a) ∩ U (a) such that u(c) − g(c ϕ(a)) > u(a).T h e n u(c) − g(c ϕ(a)) <
min{u(c)−g(c ϕ(d)) u(c)},h e n c eC ={ c d}.Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) Ashamed to be selﬁsh 119
To show Axiom P4,l e tH(b) := {a:ϕ(a)>ϕ ( b)}∩{ a:a1 >b 1}. Since u is more self-
ish than ϕ and both are weakly increasing, H(b) ⊆ U (b). Therefore, a ∈ H(b) implies
u(a)>u ( b) or {a} { b}. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.  
Proof of Theorem 2.G i v e nTheorem 1, Axiom P5 implies that g(a ϕ(b)) <
g(a  ϕ(b)) ⇔ ϕ(a)>ϕ ( a ). Therefore, g(a ϕ(b)) = g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b)),w h e r eg(ϕ(a) ϕ(b))
is strictly decreasing in ϕ(a). We now show that the function g is linear whenever it is
relevant for choice (outside of that region it can always be chosen to be linear). If not,
then there are a, a , b,a n db  such that
(i) u(a)>u ( a)−g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b)) > u(b)
(ii) u(a )>u ( a )−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)) > u(b)
(iii) u(a)>u ( a)−g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b )) > u(b )
(iv) u(a )>u ( a )−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )) > u(b )
(v) g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)) > g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b ))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )) > 0.
Conditions (i)–(iv) imply that the value of g is relevant for the four possible pair-
ings. Condition (v) captures the nonlinearity of g. The following claim implies that the
nonlinearity of g must lead to context-dependent choice.
Claim 7. There are   a and   a  such that ϕ(  a) = ϕ(a), ϕ(  a ) = ϕ(a ), conditions (ii)–(iv)
hold where   a replaces a and   a  replaces a ,a n d
g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)) > u(  a)−u(  a )>g( ϕ ( a) ϕ(b ))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )) 
Proof. By conditions (i)–(iv), ϕ(b)>ϕ ( a ) and u(a )>max{u(b) + g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)) 
u(b )+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b ))}. This observation, in addition to the property that u is more self-
ish than ϕ, implies that there is   a  such that ϕ(  a ) = ϕ(a ) and u(  a ) =
max{u(b) + g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)) u(b ) + g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b ))}. By continuity, there is   a  such
that ϕ(  a ) = ϕ(a ) and for sufﬁciently small ε>0, u(  a ) = max{u(b) + g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)) 
u(b )+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b ))}+ε.
We now show that for sufﬁciently small δ>0,t h e r ei s  a such that ϕ(  a) = ϕ(a) and
u(  a) = u(  a ) + g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b )) − g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )) + δ. A similar continuity argument as in








u(b)+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)) u(b )+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b ))
 
 
If u(b )+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )) > u(b)+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)),t h e n
u(a)>u ( b )+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )) = u(  a )−ε
>u (   a )−ε+g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b ))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )) 120 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
Thus, for ε>0 small enough, u(a)>u (   a )+g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b ))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )).
If u(b )+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )) ≤ u(b)+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)),t h e n
u(a)>u ( b)+g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b))
>u (   a )−ε−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b))+g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b))
>u (   a )−ε−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b))+g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b))+g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b ))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b ))
= u(  a )−ε+g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b ))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )) 
Again, for ε>0 small enough, u(a)>u (   a )+g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b ))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b )).
Therefore, for δ<g( ϕ ( a) ϕ(b))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b))−(g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b ))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b ))),
g(ϕ(a) ϕ(b))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b)) > u(  a)−u(  a )>g( ϕ ( a) ϕ(b ))−g(ϕ(a ) ϕ(b ))   
Claim 7 implies that
u(  a )−g(ϕ(  a ) ϕ(b)) > max
 
u(b) u(  a)−g(ϕ(  a) ϕ(b))
 
and that
u(  a)−g(ϕ(  a) ϕ(b )) > max
 
u(b ) u(  a )−g(ϕ(  a ) ϕ(b ))
 
 
Consequently, {  a } {   a   a  b} {   a b},{  a b } { b }and{  a b } {   a   a  b },whichviolates
Axiom P6.
Linearity of g together with the properties of g implied by Theorem 1,t h a ti s ,g is in-
creasing in its second argument and g(ϕ ϕ) = 0,i m p l yt h a tg(ϕ ϕ ) = β(ϕ−ϕ ).R e n o r -
malization of u and g yields the representation in Theorem 2.
Obviously the representation implies Axiom P5.T o v e r i f y t h a t Axiom P6 must
hold, let {a a  b} { a  b}. According to the representation in Theorem 2, this implies
that u(a) + ϕ(a)>max{u(a ) + ϕ(a ) u(b) + ϕ(b)}.T h e n f o r a n y b , either (i) u(b ) +
ϕ(b )<u ( a) + ϕ(a) and hence {a a  b } { a  b }, or (ii) u(b ) + ϕ(b ) ≥ u(a) + ϕ(a).
Case (ii) implies that u(b ) + ϕ(b )>u ( a ) + ϕ(a ).T h e n U({a  b }) = u(b ) + ϕ(b ) −
max{ϕ(b ) ϕ(a )}≤U({a  b }) and hence {b } { a  b }. This establishes Axiom P6 and
concludes the proof of Theorem 2.  
Proof of Theorem 3. That the representation satisﬁes the axioms is easy to verify. For
the other direction, we ﬁrst show that our Axioms N1–N4 imply the axioms posed by
Karni and Safra (1998).
In addition to Axioms N1 (Weak order) and N4 (their hexagon condition), Karni and
Safra require the following axioms.
• Independence. The relationship (a1 a) n (b1 a) for some a implies (a1 b) n
(b1 b)for all b.
IndependenceisimpliedsincebyAxiomN2, (a1 a) n (b1 a)⇔ a1 ≥ b1 ⇔ (a1 b) n
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• Restricted Solvability.I f (a1 a2)  n (b1 b2)  n (a 
1 a2), then there is x such that
(b1 b2) ∼n (x a2). And if (a1 a2)  n (b1 b2)  n (a1 a 
2), then there is y such that
(b1 b2) ∼n (a1 y).
Restricted Solvability is immediately implied by Axiom N3.
A sequence {ai} is a standard sequence, if for some a  = b, (ai a)∼n (ai+1 b)for all i.
Astandardsequenceisboundedifthereexistaandasuchthatforalli,ai ∈ (a a).D e ﬁ n e
similarly standard (and bounded) sequences by varying the second component.
• Archimedean Property. Every bounded standard sequence is ﬁnite.
To show that the Archimedean Property is implied, ﬁx a  = b and let {ai} be a stan-
dard sequence. If a>b ,t h e n{ai} is an increasing sequence and if b>a ,t h e n{ai} is a
decreasing sequence. Suppose that {ai} is bounded away from k and ∞.L e ta and a be
the least upper bound and greatest lower bound, respectively.
Case 1, a>b .B y Axiom N3,t h e r ee x i s t sx such that (a a) ∼n (x b).B y Axiom N2,
x>a. Since {ai} is an increasing and bounded sequence, it must converge to its least
upper bound, a. By continuity, there exists a subsequence {aik} that converges to x.
In particular, there exists K such that for k>K , x − aik <ε:= (x−a)/2,w h i c hi sa
contradiction.
Case 2, a<b .B yAxiom N2, (a a)≺n (a b). Since {ai} is a decreasing and bounded
sequence, it must converge to its greatest lower bound, a . By continuity, there exists I
such that i>Iimplies (ai a)≺n (a b). Since a is the greatest lower bound, Axiom N2
implies that (a b)≺n (ai+1 b). Therefore, (ai a)≺n (ai+1 b), which is a contradiction.
• Essentiality.N o t(a  b)∼n (a b) for all b or (a b) ∼n (a b ) for all a.
Essentiality is immediately implied by Axiom N3(ii).
Karni and Safra (1998) show (see the lemma in their paper) that their axioms imply
the axioms of Krantz et al. (1971). Hence, an additively separable representation exists,
where the utilities are unique up to translation and a common linear transformation
(see Theorem 2 in Chapter 6 of Krantz et al. 1971). With this knowledge, we can create a
monotone and increasing mapping a2 → γ(a2) that transforms the original indifference
maptobequasilinearwithrespecttotheﬁrstcoordinateinthe(a1 γ(a2))plane. Keeney
and Raiffa (1976) refer to the construction of this transformation as the lock-step proce-
dure.20 Quasilinearity implies that there is an increasing continuous function ξ:X → R,
suchthatϕ(a) := ξ(a1)+γ(a2)represents n. Giventheadditivelyseparablerepresenta-
tion, deﬁne v1(a1) := exp(ξ(a1)) and v2(a2) := exp(γ(a2)).T h e nv1 v2:X → R++ are in-
creasing and continuous, and if we redeﬁne ϕ(a) := v1(a1)v2(a2),i tr e p r e s e n t s n. Note
that if ϕ (a) = v 
1(a1)v 
2(a2) also represents  n, then there are α, β1,a n dβ2, all strictly
positive, such that v 
1 = β1vα
1 and v 
2 = β2vα
2. The linear structure of Theorem 2 further
requires that α = 1.  
20For brevity, we do not reproduce their argument in more detail in this paper. A direct proof of Theo-
rem 3 is available upon request.122 Dillenberger and Sadowski Theoretical Economics 7 (2012)
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